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Abstract 
 
Like the United States, managers of Japan’s large companies since the early 1950s have 
had great autonomy because shareholding is dispersed.  However, most Japanese companies 
have a significant portion of their shares stably held by other friendly financial institutions and 
businesses, a significant component of the integrated, synergistic “postwar economic system” 
embodied in the permanent employment system of industrial relations, the main bank system, 
and management independence.  Employees rather than shareholders are the main potential 
constraint, so managers have given strong priority to employee interests. 
Japan’s mediocre economic performance since 1991, and a range of publicized corporate 
scandals, are now undermining this system.  Government policies and public pressure have 
improved corporate disclosure and transparency, and have made corporate governance through 
capital markets feasible.  While managers in the future will place greater weight on shareholder 
interests, only a few companies are likely to adopt the Anglo-American corporate governance 
model.  More likely is the gradual development of a hybrid approach in which management 
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Corporate governance is a global hot topic.  In Japan, committees consider, academics 
study, polls are taken, models compete, and rhetoric abounds.  Still, while considerable change is 
underway, it is partial and inertia is powerful.  It is premature to determine how key questions 
will be answered.  Will companies shift from primary priority for employees and other inside 
stakeholders to greater emphasis on realizing value for those largely ignored stakeholders, the 
shareholders?  Will outside directors play an essential role on corporate boards? Will capital 
markets provide a major source of external governance, a role once assigned to "main banks"?  
Will a market for corporate control emerge?  Will market discipline become effective? 
It is essential to understand the context with which corporate governance is changing and 
not changing.  Governance in Japan evolved in two major states – prewar "Anglo-Saxon type" 
capitalism (Okazaki) and postwar "Japanese welfare" capitalism (Dore) and is now entering a 
third stage. 
Until the end of World War II, Japanese companies were controlled by their owners, 
typically founders or their family successors.  Some firms grew large; others failed, or were 
taken over in an active market for corporate control.  Most finance was internal or based on new 
share issuance; banks did not play a significant monitoring role.  By the early 1930s successful 
family-controlled business groups (zaibatsu) had become a major feature of Japanese big 
business industrial organization, as is the case today in Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, 
and other Asian economies.  Each major zaibatsu family used a holding company and developed 
cadres of professional managers to monitor and to manage its industrial companies.  The 
hierarchical governance of zaibatsu was effective, both in the performance of component 
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Government controls over the economy beginning in the mid 1930s substantially altered 
the economic system, and postwar Allied Occupation reforms reinforced a fundamental change 
in corporate governance.  The government took over zaibatsu shares in companies at a pittance, 
imposed capital levies (often paid in corporate stock) on the wealthy, and war-time guarantees of 
corporate borrowing were abrogated.  The shares were sold first to employees and then to other 
individuals. 
In the atmosphere of zaibatsu dissolution and Occupation economic democratization 
reforms, management successfully argued that ownership and management should be separated, 
and that an independent management should reduce the status of (equity) capital and raise that of 
labor.  Management claimed to be the mediator, serving the public interest.  However, initially 
union leaders and management mistrusted each other.  This was in part because Occupation 
reforms led to development of what became a highly politicized labor union movement.  Strikes 
and other contentious confrontations persisted until the 1950s.  Then new labor leaders gave 
priority to economic objectives, notably job security and wage increases, in an economy that was 
growing rapidly.  By the mid 1950s what has been termed the postwar system of closely 
integrated economic institutions, including the corporate governance system, was in place. 
Japan's corporate governance system is now in a third phase.  It is more market-oriented 
and has substantially greater transparency and increased weight for shareholder interest relative 
to employee interests.  Still, it is significantly different from the Anglo-American model, and is 
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The Postwar Economic System 
Over the course of Japan's high-growth era, from the early 1950s to the mid-1970s, a 
highly complementary, rather tightly linked set of economic institutions, characterized as the 
postwar economic system, developed and evolved.  In practice, this was a big-business system, 
focusing on the listed companies that are the locus of public discourse on corporate governance.  
Privately owned small and medium enterprises were a lesser part of the system, substantively 
and symbiotically, even though they provided the major share of output and employment. 
The system was a rational economic and institutional response to conditions in the 1940s 
and 1950s, especially the opportunities for rapid growth as a low-income, well-educated, 
follower economy.  The key elements were the permanent employment system of labor-
management relations, enterprise unions, separation of ownership and management control, 
stable shareholdings, main bank external finance, and supportive government policies and 
regulations.  As Aoki well analyzes, conceptually the system was founded on "contingent 
governance": control was entrusted to managers contingent on sound financial performance, and 
the main bank had the responsibility to lead the restructuring of any firm in distress. 
 
Labor-Management 
In the high-growth era, enterprise unions and management forged a win-win game in 
which workers made a no-strike commitment and accepted rapid technological changes and the 
development of firm-specific skills in exchange for permanent employment and seniority-based 
annual wage increases and promotions.  Management and union leadership came to work closely 
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stakeholders.  The relatively few instances in which a CEO and top management lost the trust of 
employees led to internal crisis and his resignation (Nitta). 
In return for employee (and public) acceptance of management as the responsible power, 
top management compensation was good but not outrageous – some 10 to 20 times employee 
average wages.  Managers also were rewarded with large expense accounts and excellent 
retirement benefits, and enjoyed prestige and high social status.  When times became so difficult, 
as they have over the past decade, that the work force had to be reduced, it has been done by a 
negotiated combination of attrition, early retirement with special benefits, and transfer of 
workers to subsidiary or other related firms rather than with lay-offs. 
Management control has been internal, hierarchical, and perpetual.  Stereotypically, the 
president of a company, in consultation with colleagues, selects a successor on becoming 
chairman after serving as CEO for six to eight years.  Boards have been large, a reward to the 
most successful managers in the seniority-based system.  The external labor market for senior 
executives is virtually non-existent; managers try to remain in power until well-compensated 
retirement, which may involve a senior position in a subsidiary.  Corporate performance is of 
course important; metrics include firm size and relative ranking, revenue growth rate, and 
reputation, as well as profitability. 
 
Ownership and Control 
Japan is the most extreme case of separation of ownership and control of listed 
companies.  In general, management controls; shareholding is dispersed or passive.  There are 
some relatively young companies that are controlled by their founders or successor families.  




-  8  - 
controlled firms.  Accordingly, one must be cautious of studies of corporate behavior that do not 
distinguish among types of firms.  This chapter focuses on the large majority of companies in 
which ownership and control are separated. 
The system is one of entrenched managerial autonomy and corporate governance by 
strong norms of managerial self-restraint.  Of course company management is not completely 
autonomous.  It is constrained by four major stakeholders, in order of importance:  its customers, 
as is true everywhere; its employees, especially those on the managerial track; its creditors, 
particularly its banks; and its shareholders.  Management has to ensure adequate performance to 
keep all the stakeholders reasonably content. 
Japanese management has two fundamental, inter-related goals.  The first is to maintain 
management independence and autonomy in a self-selected, self-perpetuating management 
system.  The second is to ensure the independent survival of the firm in perpetuity.  Bankruptcy 
and liquidation is the worst possible outcome; selling the firm (usually termed merger) is the 
second worst.  Japanese managers are not unique in their desire for autonomous control and 
power.  What is unique was that the early postwar economic and political environment enabled 
them to shape the evolving system to their great benefit. 
Management preached the ideology that the company is a community which serves 
society, with responsibilities and reciprocal obligations in particular to its employees and its 
business and financial partners (Learmount; see also Dore).  One result was a system of cozy 
back-scratching, some might say collusion, among the management of Japan's large industrial 
companies, financial institutions, and the government bureaucracies – particularly the Ministry 
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since growth made it possible to write off mistakes and difficulties easily; and allocation of 
regulatory rents and budget redistribution to lagging sectors could solve other problems. 
Profit maximization has virtually never been articulated by a Japanese manager as a 
primary objective.  Indeed, for many Japanese, profit maximization is not an accepted value; it 
connotes anti-social, selfish behavior.  In the early 1990s when Japanese senior managers were 
asked whose interest should be given first priority, inside stakeholders or shareholders, 97.1 
percent responded stakeholders.  This also was the reply of 82.7 percent of German, and 78.0 
percent of French, senior managers.  In contrast, only 24.4 percent of senior managers in the U.S. 
and 29.5 percent in the U.K. responded similarly.  (Yoshimori, 1995, cited in Allen and Gale, p. 
113.)  When asked to choose between lay-offs or dividend reduction, Japanese managers 
overwhelmingly (97.1 percent) preferred employment maintenance, unlike the U.S. (10.8 
percent) and the U.K. (10.7 percent).  Germany was 59.1 percent, France, 60.4 percent. 
While the objective is not maximization of profits or shareholder value, in practice good 
profits are necessary to buy off all stakeholders.  This was well understood by Japanese 
management in the 1960s and 1970s when corporate growth was rapid and profit rates were high.  
However, in the 1980s focus on operating profits faded and return on corporate assets (ROA) 
declined significantly.  The continuing rise in land and stock prices, culminating in the boom of 
the late 1980s, flooded companies with paper capital gains.  These not only provided the 
resources to continue satisfying stakeholders but shifted management attention away from 
operating profits, while continuing ever-more investment in plant and equipment and R&D.  
Furthermore, they generated managerial self-confidence in the system that at times crossed over 
to hubris.  Then the huge twin bubbles of stock and urban real estate prices burst at the beginning 
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Stable Shareholding 
The foremost management priority regarding shareholding was to ensure that a 
controlling interest was held by friendly companies – suppliers, customers, and especially 
financial institutions – that would not intervene in management and otherwise be passive unless 
called on to block a take-over.  The horizontal financial keiretsu epitomized this system, which 
embodied considerable cross-shareholding among companies, but stable shareholding was 
implemented by virtually every company.  At least equally important, shareholding reinforced 
ongoing business relationships. 
 
The Role of Banks 
Until the 1980s, bank loans were the dominant source of much-needed external finance 
for large companies as well as small.  Relationship banking, epitomized by the main bank 
system, was the norm.  The main bank relationship was a "more or less informal set of regular 
practices, institutional arrangements, and behavior that constitute a system of corporate finance 
and governance" (Aoki and Patrick, p. xxi).  The main bank was presumed to have access to 
privileged information from its clients and to monitor corporate performance and behavior on 
behalf of all creditors.  Banks could and did intervene to replace managers (Sheard), substituting 
for missing external markets for corporate control. However, there were few cases of large-firm 
failure or even major difficulties until the 1990s (Sheard; Hoshi and Kashyap, chapter 5). 
Japanese banks are controlled by their management.  Their shares are dispersed among a 
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core of the Big Six financial keiretsu, where group ownership was 20 to 30 percent, group firms 
have abstained from substantial monitoring. 
In the postwar system, the monitors of bank corporate governance were Ministry of 
Finance regulators.  Highly risk averse since the 1927 banking crisis, their policy was that no 
bank should fail.  They achieved this by restrictions on capital market development, wide 
regulated spreads between deposit and loan interest rates, and a convoy system in which all 
banks were to grow at about the same rate and the strong were to rescue the weak.  It came to be 
very costly and even dangerous because of the forbearance it engendered (Hoshi and Patrick). 
For decades the operating profits of banks have been extraordinarily low.  Since the 
1990s, losses on loans have been partly offset by realizing capital gains on relationship holdings 
of corporate shares, but depressed share prices have produced an ironic twist.  Banks that 
repurchased relationship shares now often have losses on them! 
 
System Overview 
The postwar economic system and, indeed, Japanese society are imbued with networks of 
strong embedded relationships – between suppliers and assemblers, sellers and buyers, banks and 
borrowers, management and employees, bureaucrats and businessmen, bureaucrats and 
politicians, politicians and support groups, and among schoolmates.  In a rapidly growing 
economy, good relationships build trust, reduce transaction costs, and provide incentives for 
specific investments and R&D activities among networks of firms.  Because Japanese do not 
much trust outsiders – whether other Japanese or foreigners – individuals and institutions invest 
great time and effort to build these relationships.  They become embedded in normal economic 
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replace the rule of law, which mainly protects outsiders who rely more on contracts and the 
courts (Milhaupt, 2001).  Embedded relationships lock the participants into each other; over time 
these become reputational, even moral, commitments.  The downsides of relationships are the 
loss of flexibility and susceptibility to moral hazard.  Breaking these relationships without strong 
reason means serious reputation loss; exit is difficult.  Japanese managers have found it hard to 
terminate supplier relationships and virtually impossible to lay off workers outright. 
 The system worked well when the economy and companies grew rapidly.  All 
stakeholders were being rewarded, mistakes were papered over, and the few firms that fell into 
distress were readily handled by their main bank and the government.  While opaque, the 
corporate and public governance systems were widely trusted and accepted.  However, 
successful catch-up growth eventually undermined the system.  In the 1970s, domestic saving 
began to exceed business investment; credit became easy.  Financial deregulation, first of interest 
rates and then of the bond market, undermined the regulatory system, and prudential regulation 
was not developed to replace it.  The bursting of the immense urban real estate and stock market 
bubbles in 1990-91 created huge balance sheet problems for corporations and financial 
institutions.  Business and government responded poorly in the 1990s, engaging in delay and 
forbearance in the vain hope that the economy would soon recover.  Japan’s mediocre growth, 
about 1.1 percent since 1992, and spreading public awareness of corporate and bureaucratic 
problems and misbehavior, led to significant erosion of confidence in management and in the 
postwar governance system (Fukao, 2003).  It has come to be more widely accepted that good 
corporate governance and good economic performance have to be founded on disclosure, 
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bureaucratic elites to a growing economy is now selfish vested interest that chokes Japan’s 
recovery. 
 
Changes in the Corporate Governance Environment 
 Japan is slowly but substantially transforming its corporate governance system, a process 
begun in the early 1990s.  Each of the major elements is changing – company top management, 
labor-management relations, shareholders, the main bank system, capital markets, outside 
auditors, and government policy.  Given space limitations, I focus on the current state of 
corporate governance without much discussion of the process of change.  For my evaluation of 
the contemporary Japanese economy see Patrick (2003). 
 
Government Policy 
 Change has been driven significantly by government bureaucrat-led reforms of corporate 
and related laws and institutions.  The rules of the game have changed substantially, much more 
comprehensively so far than the way the game is actually being played.  Milhaupt (2003), on 
which the following paragraphs are based, well describes and analyzes the formal institutional 
environment for corporate governance today, which has become significantly more flexible and 
enhancing of disclosure and transparency.  He appropriately focuses on the major changes in 
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Table 1: Distribution of Listed Company Shareholding (in percent)  
 
A. Shareholders 1991 1996 2003 
Financial Institutions  43.0 41.1  39.1
Commercial banks 15.7 15.1  7.7
Trust banks 9.8 10.3  21.4
Life insurance companies 12.0 11.1  6.7
Other financial institutions  5.5 4.6  3.3
Securities Companies 1.7 1.4  0.9
Industrial Companies 30.1 27.2  21.5
Japanese Individuals 20.4 19.4  20.6
Foreigners  4.7 10.5  17.7
Government  0.3 0.3  0.2
B. Stable and cross shareholdinga  
Stable shareholding (total) 45.6 43.4  27.1
Cross shareholding (total)  18.0 17.1  7.4
Banks  15.7 15.0  7.7
cross-shareholding  7.4 7.4  3.7
Life insurance companies  11.9 11.2  6.7 * 
Industrial companies  14.0 13.5  10.0
cross-shareholding 9.6 8.8  3.2
related companies  3.7 4.1  6.9
Other financial institutions  4.0 3.7  2.7
cross-shareholding  0.9 0.9  0.5
 
* Estimated  
 
Note:      Data are for March year shown (March 1991 is the end of fiscal 1990, and so forth.)  
a:      Stable shareholders are financial institutions and industrial corporations that hold shares on a  
    long-term basis for businesses and managerial relationship reasons.  Cross-shareholding is a  
    subset of firms holding each other’s shares, typically banks and their corporate clients. 




 Milhaupt categorizes these legal changes into two groups: flexibility enhancing 
amendments and monitoring enhancing amendments.  Firms now have greater organizational 
flexibility in rewarding employees and in mergers, divestitures, and reorganizations.  They can 
issue stock options.  They can use share exchanges in a more permissive M&A system.  The 
prohibition on holding companies has been eliminated, thereby promoting spin-offs, mergers, 
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a holding company.  Firms can now buy back their shares, and issue tracking shares.  The Civil 
Rehabilitation Act, roughly comparable to U.S. Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code, makes 
possible more effective reorganization procedures, including prepackaged bankruptcies. 
 The legal basis for better monitoring has strengthened substantially, with important 
implications.  The prohibitive filing fee for stockholder derivative suits against management was 
eliminated in 1993.  The traditional insider statutory auditor system is a key institution of 
corporate governance; its basic function is to monitor compliance with the law.  The statutory 
auditor system has been strengthened.  Now the board of audit must have at least three members, 
including at least one outsider, and by 2005 at least half of the members must be outside 
auditors. 
 Reforms of corporate boards are significant in principle, if not yet in practice.  Instead of 
the statutory auditor system, companies now can opt for a committee system of board 
organization based on the U.S. model, replacing statutory auditors with board committees for 
audit, nomination, and compensation (Nakamura).  A majority of committee members must be 
independent directors.  An executive officer system has been established for the senior managers 
who run the company operations but typically no longer serve on the board.  This enables the 
board to focus on oversight and strategy, as distinct from internal supervision and operational 
decision making. 
 Corporate accounting standards and requirements have been revised significantly to bring 
them into broad conformity with international standards, thereby substantially enhancing 
transparency.  Now required are cash flow statements, mark-to-market of financial assets, and 
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Spring 2003 legislation enhances Financial Supervisory Agency (FSA) regulatory oversight and 
monitoring of the accounting industry, despite its desire to preserve self-regulation. 
 The Big Bang legislation of 1996 aimed to make capital markets “free, fair, open and 
competitive”, and follow-on laws and newly created institutions have helped to accelerate the 
process of bank and corporate restructuring.  These include the RCC (Resolution and Collection 
Corporation), the IRCJ (Industrial Revitalization Corporate of Japan), and the Civil 
Rehabilitation Law.  The government reorganized and strengthened financial system regulatory 
oversight by splitting it off from the Ministry of Finance to the newly created FSA. 
 
Shareholding and Shareholders 
The pattern of shareholding is substantially different now than a decade ago.  The most 
dramatic changes have been the declining share of commercial bank and life insurance company 
ownership, and the rise of foreign institutional investors and trust banks. 
With declining share prices, very low dividend rates, and particularly the new mark-to-
market rules, commercial banks have been under great balance sheet and profitability pressure to 
sell their stockholdings.  This has been somewhat offset by a desire to maintain established 
relationships with major long-term clients.  In any case, as Table 1 shows, from March 1991 to 
March 2003 commercial bank and life insurance companies’ shares of listed companies' stock 
declined sharply.  Trust banks increased the share substantially, primarily reflecting their pension 
fund management business.  For all three groups, most of the change is since the 1996 Big Bang.  
Foreign holdings have been volatile but rising – going from 4.7 percent in 1991 to 17.7 percent 
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Even more revealing and important are the declines in stable shareholding (down over 18 
percentage points) and cross-shareholding (down almost 11 points).  These declines are also 
mostly since 1996.  Banks and industrial companies have sold shares in each other, though 
apparently the former much more than the latter.  The story for industrial companies is more 
mixed; they have reduced cross-shareholding with banks, but have substantially increased 
holdings in related firms, in part because of newly listed subsidiaries.  Even so, in a 1999 survey 
of 731 responding companies (out of 1307) listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange first section, 
over 98 percent (719) indicated they had stable shareholders. For almost two-thirds, stable 
holders had more than half of all shares (Nitta). 
The changing patterns of stock ownership and the new institutional environment and 
rules have made meaningful shareholder activism possible for the first time.  One important form 
has been shareholder derivative suits.  As in the U.S., this litigation is driven mainly by lawyer 
fees; shareholders have obtained few direct gains (West).  However, the successful suit in 2000 
against Daiwa Bank directors, resulting in an award of $775 million in damages, has had a huge 
shock effect.  The threat of shareholder suits has significantly altered the mind-set of corporate 
directors and audit firms, even though business and Keidanren have now successfully lobbied for 
legal limitations on director liability. 
Foreign investors, who have focused on blue-chip Japanese companies, particularly those 
with better corporate governance, also are having an impact.  Japanese CEOs have begun 
engaging in investor relations, traveling regularly to the U.S. to meet with institutional investors.  
For a sample of 1100 non-financial companies listed on the first section of the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange in the 1990s, Ahmadjian and Robbins show that the greater the percentage of a firm’s 
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employee downsizing and asset divestiture.  While the causal flow is not clear, they find no 
significant relationship between downsizing in one year and changes in foreign ownership the 
next; nor was foreign ownership likely to increase in troubled firms. 
 
The Main Bank System 
 The heyday of the main bank system was in the 1960s and 1970s; it had weakened even 
prior to the late 1980s asset bubble.  The burst bubble was disastrous for banks, corporate 
borrowers, and home owners; a huge amount of paper wealth was destroyed.  From its December 
1989 high to October 2003, the Nikkei 225 stock index was down almost 75 percent and had 
been even lower.  Nationwide land prices have declined for 12 consecutive years since 1991: by 
39.7 percent for residential land, 65 percent for commercial land, and even more in major urban 
regions. 
 The main bank system – indeed the entire banking system – were subject to a severe 
stress test and, given the balance sheet effects of the huge decreases in asset values, not 
surprisingly were found seriously wanting.  Non-performing loans (NPLs) have overwhelmed 
banks; despite write-offs of some four times their capital, banks have not yet overcome their 
NPL difficulties.  Banks do not have sufficient capital to absorb the costs of supporting the 
restructuring of their distressed large corporate borrowers.  Their commitments have become an 
albatross around the necks of main banks; they certainly no longer can be effective monitors.  At 
the extreme, zombie main banks and their zombie industrial clients are locked in a deep embrace, 
both staying alive by rolling over and even increasing loans, something made feasible by the 
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 Politicians, government bureaucrats, and bank management are all responsible for 
Japan’s banking mess.  To have been effective, main bank responsibility for restructuring 
distressed client companies required strong Ministry of Finance and Bank of Japan support and 
much larger injections of government capital than occurred.  While the myth of the 1980s was 
that land prices would never decline, the myth of the 1990s was that the economy would soon 
naturally return to its growth path. 
 Forbearance and procrastination have prevailed because of a perverse incentive structure: 
politicians do not want to be accused of using more taxpayer money to bail out rich bankers; 
regulators do not want to admit past mistakes; bank managers do not want to lose their jobs and 
pensions.  The 2003 Resona Bank bail-out provides a new and better model for bank 
restructuring.  The government injected sufficient capital that Resona can write off its NPLs and 
restore operational effectiveness; management was replaced; a U.S.-style corporate board system 
with outside directors was installed; and employment is being cut and wages sharply reduced.  
Importantly, the Resona crisis was caused by an external auditor’s tough stance.  The main 
downside was that shareholders received a windfall rather than sharing the costs.  Such 
makeshift and partial government policies have made for widespread moral hazards in the 
financial system. 
 It is a mistake to think that bank-business relationships will become arm’s-length, and 
thus highly unlikely that a main bank system with pre-emptive effective monitoring of large 
companies will be created.  Instead, serious monitoring is being undertaken by Japan’s capital 
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Capital Markets  
 Japan’s capital markets are now quite well developed in some respects, but market 
discipline and monitoring are not yet strong.  Financial deregulation culminated in the 
implementation of the Japanese Big Bang policy of the late 1990s to develop capital markets.  
Foreign financial institutions are active participants.  Institutional gatekeepers – securities 
analysts, credit rating agencies, investment banks, and knowledgeable financial media – are 
increasing in number and activity.  Accounting standards and auditing requirements and 
procedures have been strengthened.  The rules and their regulation are solid.  Stock prices now 
have an important signaling effect for investors and for company managers.  However, in the 
mediocre growth environment, viable companies are repaying debt, and the supply of equity or 
bond issues is limited. 
A merger and acquisition market has been developing, both between Japanese firms and 
with foreign firms.  The most notable industries involved are banking, where mergers have 
created four mega-banks, and automobiles, where only two domestically controlled assemblers 
(Toyota and Honda) remain of eight a decade ago.  However, virtually all mergers have been 
friendly.  There have not yet been any successful hostile take-over bids or shareholder proxy 
fights.  But, unlike a decade ago, they are now thinkable.  The failure of Yoshiaki Murakami, a 
shareholder activist, to win a second, widely publicized proxy fight against Tokyo Style 
Company in spring 2003 is suggestive both of continuing obstacles and future trends.  Tokyo 
Style is an apparel company with huge cash reserves and a stock price below its cash-equivalent 
holdings.  Despite the economic logic of a huge dividend or a major stock buy-back, the 
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Japanese institutional investor activism in corporate governance is nascent but gradually 
increasing.  Even more than in the United States, Japanese institutional investors vote with 
management.   The U.S. Pension Fund CalPERS is actively promoting its corporate governance 
guidelines in Japan, but it has no Japanese counterpart yet.  The closest is the increasingly active 
Pension Fund Association.  It has promulgated guidelines for its 1700 members which emphasize 
shareholder value and urge members to vote proxies accordingly.   
In 2002 CalPERS invested $200 million in a corporate governance-oriented fund with 
Shuhei Abe’s SPARK Asset Management Company and, in 2003, $200 million in the $1 billion 
U.S.-based Taiyo Fund with Wilbur Ross to employ friendly approaches to corporate governance 
to build value in listed Japanese companies.  Morningstar Japan has created an index of 150 
socially responsible firms.  While their quantitative impact is limited, these activities receive 
considerable publicity and are influencing the mind set of market participants. 
West and Milhaupt have noted the quite successful activist role of a non-profit corporate 
reform organization called Shareholder Ombudsman, which has been involved in high profile 
shareholder derivative suits, and has negotiated substantial monetary settlements and 
management commitments to improve practices.  This organization has not sought publicity, but 
Milhaupt argues that managers cannot afford to ignore it. 
The capital market still has major lacunae.  As the Tokyo Style case attests, there is not 
yet a market for corporate control.  This is despite the fact that a number of companies have a 
market capitalization below their ready bust-up value.  Persistent stable shareholding is part of 
the reason.  Another has been the ongoing predilection of domestic institutional investors to 
support incumbent management regardless of its performance.  Further, the corporate bond 




-  22  - 
is only nascent, and banks have not yet developed a loan market charging higher rates to riskier 
borrowers.  Their dilemma is that, should they set interest rates realistically based on 
creditworthiness, many of their borrowers would go bankrupt.  Neither the banks nor the 
politicians can afford that. 
 
The Permanent Employment System 
 Poor economic growth and the need by firms to cut costs, downsize, and restructure have 
sharply reduced the demand for labor, while the supply has continued to increase.  
Unemployment has risen to an unprecedented 5.3 percent; but that is not the full story.  
Participation rates have fallen as potential workers have withdrawn from, or never entered, the 
labor force.  Part-time workers have gone from 4.7 million in 1990 to 12 million today, some 23 
percent of those employed.  Firms have had to go beyond the traditional adjustments of overtime 
reduction, elimination of contract and temporary employees, and dispatch of workers to affiliated 
firms. 
 For many companies, downsizing requires more than attrition.  For legal and reputational 
reasons, firms have not been able simply to lay off workers.  Rather, they have pressured worker 
early retirement or “voluntary” separation by providing buy-outs.  The specifics have been 
worked out in close consultation with the enterprise unions, and there has been virtually no overt 
labor strife, despite substantial discontent.  This gradualist, expensive approach reflects 
management’s continuing commitment to its regular employees.  Senior managers have been 
particularly concerned about their eventual successors – employees on the management track.  
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permanent employment system (Ahmadjian and Robinson).  Others argue that the system is 
adjusting but has not fundamentally changed (Kato). 
 It is too early to determine what will happen to the permanent employment system.  
Wages and promotions will be based more on merit rather than seniority.  Many of today’s 
young college graduates do not believe that a company’s permanent employment commitment is 
credible; they expect to shift from one company to another over time as opportunities emerge.  I 
think the permanent employment system will persist in modified form, in part because the 
inevitable reductions in the number of Japanese of labor force age, a demographic given, will 




 In addition to its statutory auditors, companies are required to use outside auditors to 
certify their financial statements.  Auditing firms can no longer afford to be accommodating of 
management interests.  The Enron and Arthur Andersen collapses shocked Japan’s auditing 
profession.  Closer to home, in early 2002 Ohta-Showa Audit Company had to pay a substantial 
fine to the FSA for its mishandling of Long-Term Credit Bank audits.  Under revised rules, since 
March 2003 auditors are required to declare whether a client faces serious risk of going bankrupt 
within a year, and can be sued if they mislead shareholders. 
 The May 2003 decision of the auditors not to allow a full five years of Resona Bank 
deferred tax assets to count as capital was dramatic.  It meant that Resona was below the 4 
percent minimum capital requirement for domestic banks.  Unable to raise further capital 
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Suddenly auditors became major players in the governance of distressed banks and other 
companies. 
 
Corporate Management Responses 
 Japanese management is on the defensive.  Its leadership and corporate governance are 
under challenge due to sustained poor performance, exacerbated by some highly publicized 
scandals.  What has emerged is a lively debate and a fascinating clash of views and policy 
proposals between a few business leaders who actively seek to change Japanese corporate 
governance to a much more market-based, American-type system and those leaders, skeptical of 
American corporate governance in practice, who want to improve the existing Japanese system.  
The debate centers on two issues: for whose interests does the company exist; and who should be 
responsible for monitoring the company’s operations? 
 Yoshihiko Miyauchi, chairman and CEO of Orix, epitomizes those pushing for a major 
transformation of Japanese corporate governance.  In 1999 he stated: “We aim at a stockholder’s 
capitalism that brings long-run benefits to stockholders, not short-term ones as in the United 
States” (Takahashi).  He has arranged programs to train Japanese in their proper roles and 
responsibilities as potential outside directors.  Not surprisingly, the leaders of some of the blue 
chip companies in which foreign shareholding is highest are among the most outspoken 
proponents of change.  At the same time, some of Japan’s most successful companies are headed 
by defenders of the current system.  Thus, Hiroshi Okuda, chairman of Nippon Keidanren (the 
Japanese Business Federation) and former president of Toyota Motor Corporation, and Fujio 
Cho, current president of Toyota, affirm that a company’s primary commitment is to its 
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cannot be a role model.  Nonetheless, other business leaders such as Fujio Mitarai, president of 
highly successful Canon Inc., also defend the current system. 
 One test will be the number of companies that choose to shift to the new option, as of 
April 2003, of a committee-based board embodying a significant role for outside directors.  In 
their first opportunity (in most cases the June 2003 shareholder annual meetings), 36 firms 
adopted the committee-style system; 5 have more outside than internal directors, and in another 5 
the numbers are equal.  Some companies indicated they switched in order to enhance 
transparency and attract foreign investors.  Others, such as Hitachi, did so to reinforce control 
over group firms; current or former executives from the parent company are being made as 
outside directors of 18 listed group companies.  Several of the companies have come under 
foreign control (Nikkei net Interactive).   
 Some business leaders suggest the number of companies adopting the committee-based 
system will be about 125 by 2005.  That will still be small relative to the total of some 2500 
listed companies.  About 24 percent of Japanese listed companies surveyed now have at least one 
outside director and that number will increase; nonetheless managers continue to be very 
reluctant to share much power with outsiders.  And, as in all countries, an ongoing issue is how 
independent outside directors really are. 
 The trend to reduce board size sharply and create an executive officer system is 
accelerating.  Even Toyota reduced its board by more than half in 2003.  As of early 2003, 34.2 
percent of listed companies have adopted the executive officer system (Michael Solomon 
Associates).  However, establishing this system is motivated predominantly by efforts to increase 
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and their peak organization Nippon Keidanren are focusing on improvements in internal 
auditing, control, and ethical behavior, which are termed internal corporate governance (Ito). 
 Overall, corporate governance reform seems to have been driven primarily by legal and 
institutional reforms rather than a fundamental change in management mind set, at least so far.  
So, whether it wants to or not, management has to be much more responsive to shareholder 
interests due to greater disclosure and auditing requirements, the threat of being sued, and the 
embarrassment of a hostile proxy fight.   
In fiscal 2002, 783 firms announced plans to buy back up to Ұ9.7 trillion ($88.2 billion at 
Ұ110/dollar) of their shares and actually repurchased Ұ2.8 trillion.  Close to 800 firms have 
announced repurchases during fiscal 2003 of Ұ7.3 trillion.  Nippon Life, Japan’s largest 
insurance company, has taken an activist position, pressing firms with cash surpluses to carry out 
buy-back programs and to increase dividends, threatening to raise the issue at the 2004 
shareholder meetings.  Some firms are beginning to use stock options to align managerial and 
shareholder interests; however, given unattractive American experience, they are cautious.  It 
will be some time before stock options become important in aligning management and 
shareholder interests. 
 Aside from those companies and financial institutions in severe financial distress, 
Japanese management remains firmly entrenched.  Firms going through re-structuring or work-
outs will see some management personnel changed.  Their corporate governance will surely 
improve.  But, unless the firms become foreign-controlled, it is not likely their fundamental 
commitments to regular employees and internal directors will change substantially. 
 The moral hazards of the Japanese corporate governance system are quite different from 
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compensation to top management.  While American managers may steal from the company, 
Japanese managers steal for the company.  One form of moral hazard in Japan is that middle 
management expends considerable effort to protect the CEO and senior management from 
exposure of company mistakes or personal scandal.  This opaqueness has its costs, as gangster 
blackmail has demonstrated.  There are two fundamentally more important moral hazards.  First, 
management has had a proclivity to invest surplus cash in new projects, seemingly regardless of 
profitability.  Second, managers of firms in serious difficulty keep current employees far too 
long, thereby significantly eroding the value of the company, the firm’s future, and the prospects 
for both current and future employees.  And, as the company deteriorates, they do not replace 
themselves with managers who are given a mandate to carry out the needed reforms. 
 
Conclusion 
 The answer to all the questions posed at the start of the chapter is “to some extent, and in 
quite Japanese ways.”  This is because there is no monolithic Japanese corporate governance 
system today and there will not be in the future.  Different firms will have different corporate 
governance systems, depending on their histories, ownership patterns, and leaders.  This chapter 
is about the large subset of listed firms in which ownership and control are separated.  Within 
this group, the variance of corporate governance arrangements will be substantially wider than in 
the past. 
 First, one major lesson of the past decade for Japanese management is that it is essential 
to restore the early postwar understanding that profitability is very important.  Often better 
corporate governance is a code phrase for better corporate profitability.  Only by earning profits 
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power.  All firms will come to give substantially greater weight to shareholder interests, but only 
a few firms will make maximization of shareholder value a primary objective.  The important 
weight given to the interests of regular employees will persist.  This will be reinforced by the 
return to labor market tightness as the economy achieves its growth potential and as labor force 
numbers decline absolutely.   
 Second, one or even several outside directors will come to serve on most corporate 
boards, but in only a few companies will they constitute a majority.  The value of outside 
directors will continue to be founded on their independent views and judgment based on their 
own career experiences and their relationships, aside from the token symbolism for good 
corporate governance.  I doubt that more than a modest minority of Japanese companies will 
adopt the U.S.-style committee-board system, since it bestows far greater power on outside 
directors. 
 Third, the main bank system has been found wanting in the severe stress test it has 
undergone from the early 1990s, and it is unlikely to play a major monitoring role again for most 
listed companies.  Of course, some companies with traditional relationship affiliations, 
symbolized by the keiretsu, will continue to rely significantly on bank finance, though the degree 
of bank monitoring power and capability is uncertain.  Regulatory forbearance and expanded 
safety nets not only for depositors but apparently shareholders have exacerbated and lengthened 
the duration of financial system weakness. 
 Fourth, a market for corporate control will emerge, and that will have important 
psychological effects.  What is needed is the first success.  There are a number of potential 
prospects.  Hostile bids will have to be led by Japanese; behavior by the creditor banks will be 
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concerned parties will negotiate arrangements to improve corporate performance and 
governance.  
 Fifth, financial market discipline has never been strong, kept weak first by successful 
growth and now by Japan’s persistent lack of aggregate demand and poor economic 
performance.  Nonetheless, there have been and will continue to be significant improvement in 
capital market institutions and investments, and prices are coming to play a significant 
monitoring role.  Most directly benefiting will be the overlapping group of companies with large 
foreign institutional shareholding, subject to international competition, and adopting the 
committee board system. 
 The greatest improvements in Japanese corporate governance thus far have been 
substantially enhanced disclosure and transparency.  These have been mandated by legal 
reforms.  Capital markets still have a long way to go to have significant monitoring impact on 
most companies. 
I do not expect the institutions of the postwar economic system to collapse or disappear.  
My judgment as to what will happen includes the following.  The permanent employment system 
will rely less on seniority, more on merit, but the corporate commitment to permanent 
employment (to age 60) will endure.  Employees may feel less committed to the firm than 
before, but commitment will increase with years of service; labor markets for middle-aged and 
older employees are not likely to become a great deal more flexible.  Good relations between 
management and worker representatives will continue to be important, pragmatic, and relatively 
harmonious.  Companies will still want to maintain good relationships with banks and vice versa; 
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company does so poorly that it is taken over, its self-perpetuating management system will 
continue to be entrenched.   
Japan is not going to embrace the Anglo-American governance model: after all, it is 
under attack at home and how the reformed system will work is not clear.  Rather, I think 
Japanese firms will, slowly, continue to adopt (adapt) market-oriented approaches while seeking 
to retain the goals, if not the practices, of the postwar economic system.  In short, the wise 
Japanese management today is engaging in corporate government reforms that do not 
fundamentally reduce its entrenchment, while enabling the firm – and thus all its stakeholders – 
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